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Interpretation biases matching the concerns of a psychopathology have been 
implicated in the etiology of psychological disorders, but little research has investigated 
their presence in psychosis. Here we investigated negative, and specifically paranoia-
relevant, interpretation biases in patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, with (n = 32) 
and without (n = 29) paranoid symptoms and matched healthy controls (n = 29). Results 
revealed negatively biased interpretations of emotional ambiguity in both patient groups 
compared to controls; paranoid patients showing the stronger biases on material 
permitting paranoid interpretations, than on other types of ambiguous material; but mixed 
evidence that this content specific effect applied uniquely to the paranoid patient group.   
These data support models of psychopathology, including psychosis, which implicate 
cognitive biases in the formation and maintenance of core symptoms. We conclude that 
biased interpretation specifically related to paranoia deserves further detailed empirical 
investigation as a possible causal and maintaining factor for psychosis symptoms.  
Word count: Abstract: 136; Main text: 6,XXX 
Key words: paranoia, cognitive bias, interpretation, content specificity, psychosis 
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Psychosis is one of the most disabling mental health conditions, associated with distress 
and impairment in work, family and social functioning (Schizophrenia Commission, 
2012). Lifetime rates are around 3.06% (Perala, Suvisaari, & Saarni, 2007) and 
persecutory delusions, the most common form of psychotic delusion, are also prevalent in 
other disorders and present in around 10-15% of the general population (Freeman, 2007). 
In recent years cognitive treatments for psychosis, such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
(CBT) for psychosis (Hutton & Taylor, 2014), Metacognitive Training (Moritz et al., 
2014; Moritz & Woodward, 2010) and Cognitive Remediation Therapy (Wykes, Huddy, 
Cellard, McGurk, & Czobor, 2011), have been developed with some success. Most 
cognitive treatments are intended to work by changing underlying beliefs and 
maladaptive behaviors so that patients can instead process and respond to information in 
a manner that promotes wellbeing (McManus, Van Doorn, & Yiend, 2011). However, 
CBT for psychosis has shown only moderate effect sizes for delusions (van der Gaag, 
Valmaggia, & Smit, 2014), potentially because treatment is too generic and other 
cognitive treatments have focused primarily on improving general cognitive impairments, 
such as attention span and data gathering. 
Much psychosis research has focused on cognitive deficits at the global level. 
Patients are typically characterised by impairments in attention, motor skills, working 
memory and executive function (e.g. Fioravanti, Bianchi, & Cinti, 2012; O’Carroll, 
2000). These deficits are a prominent feature of psychosis and reflect generic 
impairments in cognitive abilities. In contrast, cognitive biases refer to information-
processing biases across specific cognitive domains, such as interpretation, judgment, 
decision making and reasoning (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). The most widely 
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researched cognitive bias in psychosis is reasoning bias. Research has shown that deluded 
individuals draw inferences on the basis of a smaller amount of information (i.e. ‘jump to 
conclusions’; JTC) compared to healthy and psychiatric controls (Garety & Freeman, 
1999). Other data-gathering biases associated with psychosis include a bias against 
disconfirmatory evidence (Moritz & Woodward, 2006) and a liberal acceptance bias of 
implausible information (Moritz et al., 2009).  
Some research in psychosis has focused on biases that occur irrespective of the 
emotional content of the material being processed. In contrast, we use the term 
‘pathology-congruent’ cognitive bias to refer to the selective processing of information 
that matches the content of the core pathology of a disorder (also known as content 
specificity). These more specific kind of biases have been seen as particularly important 
to our understanding of the etiology of psychological disorders for several reasons. 
Firstly, there is a clearly articulated, plausible mechanism through which pathology-
congruent cognitive biases can act in a causal manner. The suggested mechanism is that 
an enhanced tendency to select threatening (or paranoid) items for further processing (be 
it via attention or interpretation bias) is likely to lead to an artificially increased 
perception of threat (or paranoia) in the environment, which will enhance and maintain 
the matching mood and symptoms (e.g. interpreting a stranger’s stare as malicious is 
likely to support paranoid beliefs and increase distress about being at risk of observation 
by others). This in turn will promote further biased processing and a cycle of reciprocal 
causation has been suggested (Mathews, 1990; Teasdale, 1988).  
Secondly, the empirical evidence actively supports the above suggested causal 
relationship across a range of pathologies, most notably anxiety and depression.  
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Considerable research has documented the etiological importance of negatively biased 
processing in both psychological disorders and high levels of personality traits that act as 
vulnerability factors to those disorders (e.g. Yiend, 2010). For example, anxious patients, 
compared to non-anxious controls, have long been known to selectively attend to 
threatening information matching their personal concerns (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986) and to interpret ambiguous information in a manner that supports negative, 
symptom-related beliefs (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991). The more 
these biases act on emotional information matching the core symptoms of a 
psychopathology, the more potent they are in maintaining that pathology and associated 
symptoms. Recent research suggests that, in depression at least, this relationship is linear, 
with greater symptom severity being associated with stronger negatively biased 
interpretation (Lee, Mathews, Shergill, & Yiend, 2016). In addition, biases are known to 
resolve after recovery from a disorder, precede the onset of disorder and predict 
emotional response at a subsequent point in time (see MacLeod, Campbell, Rutherford 
and Wilson, 2004 for a narrative review of this evidence). These findings fail to 
disconfirm the causal hypothesis; active support for the causal role of biases comes from 
studies directly and experimentally manipulating biases and observing related effects on a 
range of relevant variables (for example, mood, proxy or actual symptoms and response 
to emotional stressors; MacLeod, 2012; but see also Cristea et al., 2015).   
In short, pathology-congruent cognitive biases are one key mechanism underlying 
pathological beliefs that are clearly implicated in the cause of the relevant 
psychopathology (Yiend, 2010). Pathology-congruent interpretation bias is an example 
of one such phenomenon (Savulich, Shergill, & Yiend, 2012). Interpretation bias has 
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been defined as ‘…a consistent tendency to interpret emotionally ambiguous stimuli, 
situations, or events in a negative (or positive) manner…’ (Lee et al., 2016) and is 
implicated in the etiology of psychological disorders, including anxiety and depression, 
as indicated above (Yiend, 2004). Cognitive experimental studies of interpretation bias 
typically employ tasks such as Similarity Ratings and Scrambled Sentences, which assess 
the degree to which pathology-congruent information is endorsed when interpreting 
ambiguity. Interpretation bias is recognized as a reliable phenomenon and one that is 
targeted by cognitive therapies across a range of disorders (Mathews, 2012). 
Furthermore, modification of interpretation bias specifically has led to some therapeutic 
benefits such as reduced anxiety (Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 2007), reduced 
vulnerability to an external stressor (Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 
2006) and improved mood (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). 
However, cognitive therapies will only be effective to the extent that they target pre-
existing biased mechanisms. In this investigation we sought to test for pathology-
congruent biases in interpretation associated with clinical symptoms of paranoia and to 
establish their level of content specificity. In doing so we aimed to highlight the 
important role that these biases might play in the maintenance of symptoms and 
associated distress in clinical paranoia.   
In psychosis there have been occasional reports of effects similar to those we 
investigate here. For example, pathology-congruent cognitive biases in attention have 
been reported using emotional Stroop (Bentall & Kaney, 1989), cue-target pairs (Moritz 
& Laudan, 2007), visual search (Phillips, Senior, & David, 2000) and eye tracking 
(Green, Williams, & Davidson, 2003). Bias has been examined in patients with 
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persecutory delusions who, in one study, showed preferential recall of threat-related 
stories (Kaney, Wolfenden, Dewey, & Bentall, 1992) and, in another, an attributional bias 
blaming others for negative events (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). Questionnaire (Combs 
et al., 2009; Combs, Penn, Wicher, & Waldheter, 2007; An, Kang, Park, Kim, Lee, & 
Lee, 2010) and virtual reality methods (Freeman et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2008) have 
been used to investigate perceived hostility about the intentions of others and jumping to 
conclusions has been examined using emotional as well as specifically delusion-relevant 
information (Menon, Mizrahi, & Kapur, 2008; Lincoln, Salzmann, Ziegler, & 
Westermann, 2011). However, none of the above has investigated the phenomenon of 
biased interpretation in the processing of emotional ambiguity using the established, 
reliable methodologies from the field of cognitive experimental psychology. 
In a non-clinical analogue to the current study, our own laboratory has 
investigated pathology-congruent interpretation bias in individuals with high levels of 
trait paranoia (Savulich, Freeman, Shergill, & Yiend, 2015). Individuals with high trait 
paranoia interpreted ambiguous information more negatively than those with low trait 
paranoia, and crucially, this effect was more pronounced for information directly related 
to paranoid concerns. This suggests that interpretation of paranoia-specific (and thus 
more highly pathological) information might underlie paranoid symptoms in individuals 
with elevated vulnerability. We set out to test this same hypothesis in the current study by 
conducting a comprehensive and methodologically rigorous investigation of 
interpretation bias in a clinical sample of patients with psychosis. We sought to pinpoint 
biases, which are likely to directly precipitate negative paranoid cognitions, 
sustain persecutory delusions and further entrench paranoid beliefs. This in turn could 
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help to better inform the best mechanisms to target with cognitive treatments.  
 The specific aim of the present study was to investigate the degree to which 
paranoia-relevant and more generally valenced (positive/negative) interpretation biases 
differed between three groups with varying levels of paranoia: patients with a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia with paranoid symptoms (mild paranoid or beyond), patients with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia without paranoid symptoms (absent or in the upper limits of 
normal) and matched healthy controls.  
We included a measure of the data-gathering bias discussed earlier, specifically 
the jumping to conclusions (JTC) task, for two reasons. Firstly, we wished to illustrate 
the important conceptual differences between data-gathering biases (which have been 
widely investigated in psychosis populations), and the biases in emotion processing that 
were the focus of our current investigation (see Savulich et al., 2012). Secondly, we 
wished to benchmark the cognitive performance of our sample against previous results 
reported in similar samples in the literature (see Garety & Freeman, 2013 and Freeman, 
2007 for reviews). We considered it important to evidence that any emotionally relevant 
interpretation biases that we observed were not due to some idiosyncrasy of our sample 
selection.  
We hypothesized:  
1) that both patient groups would be more negatively biased in their 
interpretations of emotionally ambiguous information than controls, and  
2) that content specificity would be shown, whereby paranoid patients would be 
more biased on material permitting paranoid interpretations, than on other types of 
ambiguous material, and  
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3) this specificity would be less apparent in patients with fewer paranoid 





Sixty-one patients were recruited to participate in the study from: the South London and 
Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust; the Psychological Interventions Clinic for Outpatients 
with Psychosis; the Lewisham Early Intervention Service and the Cognition, 
Schizophrenia & Imaging laboratory at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & 
Neuroscience, King’s College London. Inclusion criteria were fluency in English; age 18 
to 65; a diagnosis of schizophrenia according to DSM-IV-TR criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), either with mild paranoia or beyond (paranoid patient 
group, n = 32) or without paranoia or in the upper limits of normal (non-paranoid patient 
group, n = 29); prescribed medication and dose unchanged in the last three months; and 
not having received CBT or any talking therapy in the two weeks prior to participation. 
Exclusion criteria were previous head injury resulting in a loss of consciousness for more 
than three minutes and current physical illness.  
Healthy control participants (n = 29) were recruited from within the staff and 
student population of King’s College London and the local community of South East 
London. Inclusion criteria were fluency in English; age 18 to 65; not currently taking any 
psychological or psychiatric medication; and not having a past or current psychological 
or psychiatric diagnosis. Exclusion criteria were as for patients.  
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The Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale (PANSS). The PANSS (Kay, Fiszbein, & 
Lewis, 1987) is a 30-item clinical tool that measures symptom severity in schizophrenia. 
It consists of three subscales with seven items for positive symptoms, seven items for 
negative symptoms and 16 items for general symptoms. Each symptom is rated on a 7-
point Likert scale from 0 (symptom absent) to 7 (symptom extreme) (with a minimum 
score of 7 and a maximum score of 40 for the positive and negative symptoms subscales; 
and a minimum score of 16 and a maximum score of 112 for the general symptoms 
subscale). This tool was administered at the beginning of the experimental session to 
establish the presence and severity of paranoid symptoms. Patients were allocated to 
either the paranoid or non-paranoid patient group based on their score on the P6 
Suspiciousness/Persecution item of this instrument. This item measures unrealistic or 
exaggerated ideas of persecution using a scale where 1 = absent; 2 = minimal, may be at 
upper extreme of normal limits; 3 = mildly symptomatic, then incrementally upwards to 7 
= extreme persecutory delusions.  Accordingly patients scoring 2 or lower were allocated 
to the non-paranoid group and those scoring 3 or over were allocated to the paranoid 
group. Thus, the non-paranoid group was characterised by absent to ‘normal’ paranoia 
and the paranoid group was characterised by mild to severe paranoia. 
 
The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I). The M.I.N.I (Sheehan, 
Lecrubier, & Sheehan, 2011) is a structured diagnostic interview used to screen for major 
Axis 1 psychiatric disorders. Participants answer ‘yes/no’ questions corresponding to 15 
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diagnostic categories. Participants answering ‘yes’ to questions are then probed further 
with a series of questions that indicate whether diagnostic criteria are met. This interview 
was used to confirm the diagnosis of schizophrenia and to identify comorbid psychiatric 
disorders in the patient groups and to screen for psychiatric disorders in controls; only 
those screening negative for all disorders were invited to participate in the study as 
controls.  
Clinical instruments were administered by fully trained members of the research 
team. 
 
Demographic and Questionnaire Measures 
Participants completed a battery of questionnaires measuring premorbid intelligence, 
paranoia, delusions, anxiety and depression.  
 
The Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR). The WTAR (Wechsler, 2001) is an 
estimate of premorbid intelligence. Participants are instructed to read a 50-item word list 
aloud. The total score is the number of words pronounced correctly, with higher scores 
indicating higher intelligence (range is 0 – 50).  
 
The Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS). The GPTS (Green et al., 2008) is a 
32-item multidimensional measure of paranoid thinking. This scale is comprised of two 
16-item subscales that assess ideas of reference and thoughts of persecution. Participants 
indicate thoughts that they might have had about others over the past month by rating 
statements using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all to 5 = totally). Higher scores 
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indicate more paranoid thoughts (range is 0 – 160).  
 
The Paranoia Scale. The Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) is a 20-item 
measure of paranoia. Participants indicate thoughts about themselves and others by rating 
statements using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all to 5 = totally). Higher scores 
indicate a higher degree of paranoia (range is 0 – 100).   
 
Peters’ Delusion Inventory (PDI-21). The PDI-21 (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999) is a 
21-multidimensional measure of delusions. Participants answer ‘yes/no’ questions about 
their beliefs. Participants answering ‘yes’ to any question then rate the level of distress, 
preoccupation and conviction of their belief using a 5-point Likert scale. Higher scores 
indicate a greater degree of delusional ideation (range is 0 – 336).  
 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). The HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983) is a 14-item measure of anxiety and depression. Each item is scored from 0-3, with 
a range from 0 to 21 for each subscale. Higher total score indicates higher level of 
anxiety and depression. 
 
Experimental Tasks 
Similarity Rating Task (SRT). The SRT (Eysenck et al., 1991; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000) is a widely used measure of interpretation bias that presents participants with 
emotionally ambiguous passages (for a detailed description of this task see Yiend, 
Mackintosh & Mathews, 2005). Disambiguated sentences are subsequently rated for 
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similarity to the corresponding passage. Individuals with a tendency towards negative 
interpretation bias endorse negatively disambiguated sentences more strongly than 
positively disambiguated sentences. Sentences denoted as ‘targets’ measure interpretation 
bias; sentences denoted as ‘foils’ measure response bias (the tendency to endorse any 
negative/positive sentence irrespective of whether it is related to the passage previously 
read). The task was comprised of 15 paranoia relevant and 15 generally valenced 
passages. Each passage consisted of three sentences that described a variety of social 
situations. First, participants encoded the emotionally ambiguous passages by reading and 
completing a word fragment (i.e. ‘fill in the missing letter’) and answering a question at 
the end of a text passage. For example: ‘After a long morning you enter the canteen for 
lunch. While waiting in the queue, you look for your colleagues and hope to join them. 
Across the room, two girls begin to …’ followed by the word fragment wh-sp-r (whisper) 
and comprehension question ‘Did you enter the canteen for lunch?’ (Correct answer: 
yes).  
Subsequently, in the so-called ‘Recognition Test’ participants rated the similarity 
to the corresponding original text passage, of individual disambiguated sentences. Four 
sentences were randomly presented, one at a time, beneath the title of their corresponding 
passage. Participants were asked to rate ‘how similar is this sentence to the original 
passage?’, on a scale from 1 (= very different) to 4 (= very similar). ‘Target’ sentences 
reflected possible meanings of the original text passage; ‘foil’ sentences were not directly 
relevant to the passage. Foil sentences retained the same degree of paranoia/non-paranoia 
or negativity/positivity as target sentences but were factually unrelated to the content of 
their associated passage. Corresponding disambiguating target and foil sentences for the 
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previous example item were ‘The girls are plotting against you’ (target, paranoid 
interpretation), ‘The girls are talking about their friend’ (target, non-paranoid 
interpretation), ‘Your doctor gives you suspicious medication’ (foil, unrelated paranoid 
interpretation), and ‘Your doctor gives you beneficial medication’ (foil, unrelated non-
paranoid interpretation). Interpretation bias is inferred from higher average similarity 
ratings that favour one type of meaning over another (paranoid/non-paranoid; 
negative/positive). In this study, paranoid relevant items reflected intention of harm by a 
persecutor (Freeman & Garety, 2000). Five independent clinicians with expertise in 
psychosis had previously validated these items by rating each item’s level of 
paranoia/non-paranoia (pilot analyses reported by Savulich et al., 2015). Generally 
valenced items had been validated in numerous other studies with different non-clinical 
analogue and patient groups (e.g. Yiend et al., 2014; Yiend, Parnes, Shepherd, Roche, & 
Cooper, 2014; Yiend, Savulich, Coughtrey, & Shafran, 2011) and were taken from those 
originally reported by Eysenck et al. (1991). Bias scores for paranoid and negative target 
sentences (mean paranoid/negative target rating – mean non-paranoid/positive target 
rating) were moderately correlated (r = .40, p = .001) and showed good Spearman-
Brown’s split-half reliability (.53).  
 
Scrambled Sentences Task (SST). The SST (Wenzlaff, 1993) is a widely used measure 
of interpretation bias, requiring participants to reorder strings of words to construct 
grammatically correct statements. Each word string can be reordered into one of two 
possible statements, with positive and negative meanings, respectively. The proportion of 
negative statements constructed (out of the total number of items completed in the time 
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allowed) gives an index of the degree of negative bias. Here, participants were instructed 
to unscramble two blocks of 20 sentences (each block contained 10 sentences with 
paranoia-relevant meanings and 10 sentences with generally emotional meanings) by 
reordering five out of six jumbled words to create grammatically correct sentences. For 
each set of unscrambled sentences, either a paranoid/non-paranoid or a negative/positive 
sentence could be made. For example, the paranoia relevant scrambled sentence 
‘aggressive someone me friendly toward was’ could be unscrambled to be either 
‘Someone was aggressive toward me’ (paranoid interpretation) or ‘Someone was friendly 
toward me’ (non-paranoid interpretation); the valenced scrambled sentence ‘winner am 
born I loser a’ could be unscrambled to be either ‘I am a born loser’ (negative 
interpretation) or ‘I am a born winner’ (positive interpretation). Participants were given 
four minutes to complete this task and were asked to recall a six-digit number before and 
after unscrambling to create a cognitive load. This load was included to interfere with any 
tendency for participants to suppress or control their bias. The paranoia items of the SST, 
also validated by five practicing clinicians (as above), have shown sensitivity to detect 
symptoms relevant to interpretation biases in high levels of trait paranoia (Savulich et al., 
2015). Valenced items have shown sensitivity to detect symptom-relevant interpretation 
biases in depression (Yiend et al., 2014; Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003; Lee et 
al., 2016). Percentage of paranoid and negative sentences were strongly correlated (r = 
.70, p < .001) and showed good Spearman-Brown’s split-half reliability (.82).  
 
Jumping to Conclusions Task (JTC). On this task, participants were instructed to decide 
which was the predominant colour (black or white) in a bag of 100 beads (Huq et al., 
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1988). Participants were informed that the ratio of coloured beads was 60:40 (difficult 
version of task: 60:40; easy version of task: 85:15; Garety et al., 2013), but were not told 
which colour was the dominant one. The experimenter reached into a bag without looking 
and removed one bead at a time, continuing to take out as many beads as needed before 
the participant could confidently decide which colour ratio the bag contained (more black 
or more white). Participants were permitted as many beads as needed before making a 
decision. A fewer number of beads needed before making a decision indicates a greater 
‘jumping to conclusions’ reasoning bias. Typically, a third of patients with delusions will 
make a decision after choosing around two beads on this version of the task.  
 
Procedure 
This study received full ethical approval from the South East London Research Ethics 
Committee (11/LO/0070). All referrals were outpatients at NHS mental health services at 
the time of taking part in the study. Patients were identified by a research nurse at the 
Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, a participant research panel provided 
by the Psychological Interventions Clinic for Outpatients with Psychosis and lead 
clinicians at the Lewisham Early Intervention Service. Control participants were recruited 
from internal mailing of King’s College London students and staff and advertisements in 
the local community. Control participants were screened for psychiatric disorders using 
the M.I.N.I. and selected to match patients for premorbid IQ, gender and age distribution. 
All participants completed the experimental and clinical measures described above. 
Experimental measures were counterbalanced using a three-factor Latin-square design. 
Clinical measures were administered after the experimental measures to reduce demand 
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Participant Characteristics       
The mean scores and standard deviations of all demographic, clinical symptoms (patients 
only), and personality measures for the paranoid patient group (n = 32), non-paranoid 




Groups were matched on age, premorbid IQ and gender ratio. Any differences in 
cognitive test measures are therefore not attributable to differences in these demographic 
variables. All patients were in receipt of medication but with dose unchanged in the last 
three months. By design, the paranoid patient group scored significantly higher on the 
PANSS P6 Suspiciousness/Persecution item than the non-paranoid patient group and also 
on the positive, general and total symptoms subscales of the PANSS (Table 1). Scores on 
item P6 ranged from 1 to 6 in the entire sample at the following percentages: scoring 1 
(16.75%); scoring 2 (15.6%); scoring 3 (23.3%); scoring 4 (7.8%); scoring 5 (3.3%); and 
scoring 6 (1.1%).  
As expected, the paranoid and non-paranoid patient groups significantly differed 
on measures of paranoia (GPTS: t(52.12) = 3.76, p < .001, d = .95, 95% CI, 14.74, 48.94; 
Paranoia Scale: t(59) = 2.14, p = .036, d = .55, 95% CI, .67, 20.07), delusions (PDI-21: 
t(52) = 2.60, p = .012, d = .72, 95% CI, 10.40, 80.30) and anxiety and depression (HADS: 
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(t(48) = 2.16, p = .036, d = .62, 95% CI, .37, 10.09). Due to the potential confound with 
anxiety and depression levels, the analyses reported below were repeated using HADS as 
a covariate. This did not change the pattern of results reported; key interactions remained 
significant. Furthermore, the two patient groups were well matched diagnostically for co-
morbid depression (X2 = .01, p = .94), generalized anxiety disorder (X2 = 1.66, p = .20), 
mania/hypomania (X2 = 1.87, p = .17), obsessive-compulsive disorder (X2 = .01, p = .94), 
posttraumatic stress disorder (X2 = .01, p = .94) and substance abuse in the last 12 months 
(X2 = 1.87, p = .17).  
Table 2 shows correlations between bias measures for each task (SRT, SST, JTC) 
across all participants and correlations between bias measures for each task and the 




Similarity Ratings Task 
An interpretation bias on this task is indicated by the presence of a Sentence Type (target, 
foil) x Stimulus Direction (pathological congruent, non-pathological congruent) 
interaction, indicating interpretation bias effects specific to targets rather than control 
items (foils). Alternatively, an effect involving Stimulus Direction alone (here, a Stimulus 
Direction x Group interaction) would be expected where an interpretation bias exists but 
is indistinguishable from response bias. In the present study we additionally expected the 
factor Content to interact with the above terms to demonstrate bias that was specific to 
paranoid items for the relevant groups (i.e. pathology-congruent bias).  
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A four-way mixed design ANOVA was therefore conducted on mean similarity 
ratings, with factors Content (paranoid, valenced) x Sentence Type (target, foil) x 
Stimulus Direction (pathological congruent, non-pathological congruent) x Group 
(paranoid patient, non-paranoid patient, control). This revealed a significant four-way 
interaction, F(2,78) = 4.23, p = .018, partial ηp2 =.10, ε = 1 with main effects of Content, 
F(1,78) = 30.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, ε = 1, Sentence Type, F(1,78) = 136.00, p < .001, 
ηp2= .64, ε = 1 and Stimulus Direction, F(1,78) = 144.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .65, ε = 1. The 
Sentence Type main effect reflected endorsement of target sentences as more similar in 
meaning to the original passages than foil sentences (M = 2.30, SD = .32 vs. M = 1.85, 
SD = .39), as might be expected and is commonly found on this task. Mean participant 
ratings and standard deviations of each sentence type (targets and foils) for paranoia 
relevant and valenced items are indicated in Table 31.   
                                                        
1 For comparability with studies using alternative participant groupings, we repeated 
analyses allocating participants to groups based on the PANSS P1 Delusions item (i.e. 
beliefs which are unfounded, unrealistic and idiosyncratic) where Group 1 comprised 
those scoring two or lower and Group 2 comprised those scoring 3 or over where 1 = 
absent, 2  = minimal (‘normal’), 3 = mild and up to 7 = extreme. Relevant interactions 
changed little and were: Content x Sentence x Stimulus x Group, F = 4.28, p = .017 and 
Content x Group, F = 4.56, p = .013 for the SRT and SST tasks respectively. Analyses 
were also repeated using a more stringent PANSS P6 Suspiciousness/Persecution group 
allocation score (i.e. those scoring 3 or lower were allocated to the non-paranoid group 
and those scoring 4 or higher were allocated to the paranoid group). Again relevant 
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To interpret the four-way interaction, follow up mixed ANOVAs (Sentence Type x 
Stimulus Direction x Group) were conducted for each type of content separately 
(paranoid, valenced).  
Valenced material: For valenced items, the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(2,78) = 2.55, p = .084, ηp2 = .06, ε = 1. However, the Stimulus Direction x 
Group interaction was significant, F(2,78) = 12.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, ε = 1 (negative 
direction: paranoid patient: 1.97, SD = .37, non-paranoid patient: 1.96, SD = .48, control 
= 1.65, SD = .23; positive direction: paranoid patient: 2.37, SD = .45, non-paranoid 
patient: 2.44, SD = .43, control = 2.52, SD = .44). Follow-up independent samples t-tests 
indicated that both patient groups were significantly more negatively biased than the 
healthy control group, both in terms of specific interpretation of the ambiguous text 
presented (target items) and in terms of a more general response bias (foil items) 
(paranoid vs. control, t(45.24) = 3.89, p < .001, d = 1.04, 95% CI, .16, .48; non-paranoid 
vs. control, t(31.87) = 2.91, p = .007, d = .81, 95% CI, .09., .53). The patient groups did 
not differ significantly from healthy controls on positive interpretations (paranoid vs. 
control, t(54.85) = -1.28, p = .21, d = .34, 95% CI, -.39, .09; non-paranoid vs. control, 
t(51) = -.68, p = .50, d = .18, 95% CI, -.32., .15). Thus in support of hypothesis 1, both 
patient groups were more biased, both in their responses to and interpretations of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
interactions changed little and were: Content x Sentence x Stimulus x Group, F = 4.51, p 
= .014 and Content x Group, F = 4.04, p = .021, for the SRT and SST tasks, respectively. 
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emotionally ambiguous information, compared to controls. Results on valenced items 
alone, could not, however speak to our other hypotheses.  
Paranoid material: For paranoid items, the corresponding three-way interaction 
was significant, F(2,78) = 17.30, p <.001, ηp2 = .31, ε = 1. To interpret this we conducted 
separate two-way ANOVAs (Stimulus Direction x Group) for each Sentence Type 
(target, foil) on paranoid items only, in line with previous studies (Yiend et al., 2011; 
Yiend et al., 2005; Savulich et al., 2015). These revealed a significant Stimulus Direction 
x Group interaction for paranoid targets, F(2,78) = 16.68, p < .001, ηp2= .30, ε = 1, but 
not foils, F(2,78) = .60, p = .55, η2 = .02, ε = 1. The pattern of results for paranoia 




Follow-up independent samples t-tests showed that both patient groups made 
significantly more paranoid interpretations compared to controls (non-paranoid vs. 
control, t(51) = 2.79, p = .007, d = .75, 95% CI, .07, .52; paranoid vs. control, t(43.62) = 
4.68, p < .001, d = 1.23, 95% CI, .27, .68 and significantly fewer non-paranoid 
interpretations compared to controls, (non-paranoid vs. control, t(51) = -2.86, p = .006, d 
= .77, 95% CI, -.58, -.10; paranoid vs. control, t(55) = -3.27, p = .002, d = .84, 95% CI -
.58, -.14). The two patient groups did not differ significantly from each other in their 
biased interpretations of paranoia relevant material (on paranoid sentences: paranoid vs. 
non-paranoid patients, t(50) = 1.38, p = .175, d = .40, 95% CI -.08, .44, paranoid group 
mean = 2.21, SD= .46, non-paranoid group mean = 2.02, SD = .48); on non-paranoid 
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sentences: paranoid vs. non-paranoid patients, t(50) = -.12, p = .91, d = .75, 95% CI -.27, 
.24, paranoid group mean = 2.37, SD = .43, non-paranoid group mean = 2.38, SD = .48). 
Figure 1a illustrates the specific finding from this task, reflecting the above two-way 
interaction (F = 16.68, p < .001), namely significant group differences in the specific 
interpretation of ambiguous material (i.e. target items), only when that material permits 
interpretations relevant to paranoid thinking (i.e. paranoia relevant content only). These 
findings supported hypothesis two by revealing a specific bias in the interpretation of 
ambiguity related to potentially paranoid content in paranoid patients. In contrast, 
hypothesis three was not supported in that the degree of content specificity did not differ 
significantly between our two patient groups.   
Figure 1b summarizes the overall pattern of the four-way interaction (F = 4.23, p 
= .018) using ‘interpretation bias scores’, now including both types of material (paranoia 
relevant and general negative/positive valence) for target items only. Unlike raw 
similarity rating scores (Figure 1a), interpretation bias scores reflect the overall degree of 
bias by taking into account both directions of endorsement (paranoid or negative and 
non-paranoid or positive) and are, arguably, a more accurate indicator of bias (see 




Scrambled Sentences Task 
Following Yiend and colleagues (2014), interpretation bias was calculated as the 
percentage of sentences unscrambled to create a paranoid (or negative) meaning. The 
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total number of sentences unscrambled to create a paranoid (or negative) meaning was 
divided by the total number of paranoid (or valenced) sentences attempted, multiplied by 
100. Only sentences that were exact matches to unscrambled paranoid/negative stimuli 
were included in the count of the numerator. Any sentences containing errors (e.g. 
sentences that were grammatically incorrect; sentences unscrambled using fewer than 
five words) were excluded from the numerator, but included in the denominator. Thus a 
higher percentage would indicate evidence of a more paranoid (or negative) interpretation 
bias. Percentages and standard deviations of paranoia relevant and valenced sentences for 
each group are indicated in Table 3.  
A two-way mixed design ANOVA was conducted on the percentage of negative 
sentences created, with factors Content (paranoid, valenced) x Group (paranoid patient, 
non-paranoid patient, control). A main effect of Group, F(2,81) = 22.20, p < .001, ηp2= 
.35, revealed that both patient groups were negatively biased compared to healthy 
controls (paranoid patients: 42.68%, SD =  22.88; non-paranoid patients: 22.56%, SD = 
19.95; controls: 10.94%, SD = 10.35). Both the paranoid and non-paranoid patient groups 
unscrambled significantly more negative sentences than the control group (paranoid vs. 
control, t(40.68) = 6.90, p < .001, d = .07, 95% CI, 22.45, 41.03; non-paranoid vs. 
control, t(35.82) = 2.63, p = .013, d =  .73, 95% CI, 2.64, 20.62). Again this pattern of 
results supported hypothesis 1, in suggesting negative biases in both patient groups, 
compared to controls. 
The analysis also revealed a significant Content x Group interaction, F(2,81) = 
5.26, p = .007, ηp2= .12, ε = 1, which was broken down by the factor Group. Paranoid 
patients made significantly more paranoid interpretations (i.e. created more sentences 
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with a paranoid meaning; 48.96%, SD = 24.84 see Table 2) than negative interpretations 
(36.40%, SD  =26.47, t(29) = 2.96, p = .006, d = .49, 95% CI, 3.87, 21.24), lending 
support for hypothesis 2. Regarding hypothesis 3, neither the non-paranoid patients, nor 
control groups, differed in the percentage of paranoid and negative interpretations made 
(non-paranoid patients: t(24) = 1.26, p = .218, d = .22, 95% CI, -3.19, 13.37; controls: 
t(28) = 1.67, p = .106, d = .28, 95% CI, -7.14, .72). This suggested that the content 
specific effect observed in paranoid patients was not apparent in non-paranoid patients or 
healthy controls on this task, meaning hypothesis three was also supported because 
specificity was less evident in these groups. Independent samples t-tests showed that 
paranoid patients were significantly more negatively biased than non-paranoid patients, 
both in terms of a paranoia specific and generally valenced interpretation bias, t(53) = 
3.52, p = .001, d = .95, 95% CI 10.28, 37.47 and t(53) = 2.59, p = .012, d = .71, 95% CI 




Jumping to Conclusions Task 
The paranoid patient group requested the least number of beads before making a decision 
(M = 6.88, SD = 5.60), followed by the non-paranoid patient (M = 13.10, SD = 15.79) 
and control groups (M = 16.21, SD = 17.70). A one-way ANOVA revealed these 
differences were significant, F(2,87) = 3.61, p = .031, ηp2 = .08. Follow-up tests indicated 
that the patient groups did not differ significantly from each other (p = 0.25), and that the 
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paranoid group differed significantly from controls, t(59) = -2.83, p  = .031, d = .74, 95% 
CI, -18.01, -.65, whereas the non-paranoid group did not (p = 1.0).   
 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to use robust cognitive experimental methods to 
investigate interpretation biases in psychosis and to observe variations in these biases 
between clinical groups, with greater and fewer symptoms of paranoia, and matched 
healthy controls. We hypothesized, firstly, that negatively biased interpretations would be 
more evident in patient groups compared to controls. Secondly, we hypothesized that 
there would be evidence of content specificity, with paranoid patients being more biased 
on material permitting paranoid interpretations, compared to other ambiguous material. 
Thirdly, we hypothesized that this content specificity would be less apparent in non-
paranoid than paranoid patients.  
 In support of our first hypothesis, evidence of negative interpretation bias was 
found in both patient groups compared to healthy controls, on two independent measures 
of interpretation. Using ambiguous text passages, and measuring interpretations using 
similarity ratings of disambiguating sentences, both patient groups were more negatively 
biased than healthy controls. This bias was evident both in terms of the specific 
interpretation of the ambiguity presented (target items) and in terms of a more general 
response bias (foil items). Using scrambled sentences, which could be unscrambled to 
make either negative or positive meanings, both patient groups created a significantly 
higher percentage of negative meanings (both valenced and paranoid) than did healthy 
controls.  
                                                                                     Interpretation biases in paranoia    
   
 
26 
There was also support for our second hypothesis. On the Scrambled Sentences 
task, paranoid interpretation bias was stronger than negative interpretation bias for 
paranoid patients only, thus showing the selective processing of information matching 
their core symptoms. Results from the Similarity Ratings task further showed that 
consistent with hypothesis two, interpretation bias was only found for material relevant to 
paranoid thinking (i.e. target sentences). In line with our third hypothesis, neither non-
paranoid patients nor controls showed evidence of content specificity on the Scrambled 
Sentences task. However, no clear differences were found in paranoia relevant 
interpretation bias between the patient groups on the Similarity Ratings task.  
Evidence of a pathology-congruent interpretation bias on the Scrambled 
Sentences task, but not Similarity Ratings task, could be because paranoid material is 
relevant to all patients with psychosis to some degree, or that we did not have enough 
power to detect differences between patient groups given the more complex design of the 
latter. Lack of content specificity could also be due to a materials effect, in which 
materials on the Scrambled Sentences task are more sensitive, or better matched, to 
participants’ specific concerns than the Similarity Ratings task, or because the former 
may tap into additional biased cognitive mechanisms beyond interpretation (e.g. selective 
attention) and thus produce additive effects. A further difference between the tasks is the 
use of cognitive load that may have prevented top-down inhibition of cognitive biases. 
Nonetheless, correlational analyses revealed that measures of paranoia and delusions 
were, for the most part, more strongly associated with indices of paranoid interpretation 
bias than with indices of negative interpretation bias.  
Results from the ‘jumping to conclusions’ task revealed a pattern similar to that 
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reported in the previous literature (Garety et al., 2013), suggesting the cognitive 
performance of our sample was broadly as expected. Correlational analyses further 
revealed that interpretation bias measures were highly associated with each other, but not 
with the JTC task, reinforcing that biases in interpretation and reasoning can co-occur, 
but are conceptually different phenomenon in psychosis.  
 The present results confirm and extend the findings of our previous study, 
conducted in an analogue, non-clinical sample (Savulich et al., 2015). In that study we 
reported pathology-congruent interpretation bias in individuals with high trait paranoia, 
compared to those with low trait paranoia. As replicated here, content specific effects in 
that study were most pronounced for information directly related to paranoid concerns on 
the Scrambled Sentences task. In other work we have shown how important it is to 
replicate findings from subclinical samples in the corresponding patient group (Yiend et 
al., 2015) and the current study provides this. Another strength of the current 
investigation, which enhances validity, was that we found a consistent pattern of 
negatively biased interpretations across multiple tests of interpretation bias (ambiguous 
passages and scrambled sentences). This convergence of findings, both within the current 
study, and across subclinical and clinical groups, lends more weight to our results and 
increases the confidence which can be placed in the conclusions. Together these data 
suggest that people with clinical symptoms of paranoia, and those with elevated 
vulnerability to clinical paranoia, make interpretations of emotionally ambiguous 
information in a manner that could maintain paranoid beliefs. The content specificity of 
interpretation biases associated with paranoia has been relatively under researched 
(Savulich et al., 2012), but the present data go some way to redress this.  
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 Based on our findings, we propose a specific cognitive mechanism exists in 
subclinical and clinical paranoia, whereby content specific interpretation biases lead to 
increasingly selective processing of information as it more closely matches an 
individuals’ paranoid concerns. Additional research involving either manipulation of 
biases or longitudinal designs will be needed to test this hypothesis, as the present data 
are merely correlational. The proposed mechanism could work by selective processing 
acting to enhance both the subjective perception and the actual exposure to information 
consistent with paranoid thinking. Indeed this suggestion in consistent with existing 
general cognitive models of selective processing biases in psychopathology (e.g. 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998) and adds more specificity, including additional testable 
predictions including causality, to specific cognitive models of psychosis. For example, 
the ‘threat anticipation cognitive model of persecutory delusions’ (Freeman, Garety, 
Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002) proposes that the cognitive biases associated with 
psychosis are one route to an anomalous experience. According to this model, search for 
the meaning of an anomalous experience leads to the formation of a threat belief, which 
is maintained, if confirmed, by cognitive processes. Interpretation biases could be one 
such process, and their etiological role deserves further detailed empirical investigation in 
clinical paranoia.   
Our study suffered from several limitations. Firstly, we did not have a patient 
control group without psychosis, only a matched healthy sample who inevitably differed 
markedly from patients on a wide range of variables. Although this omission does not 
undermine our conclusions, as outlined above, it nevertheless precludes the possibility to 
demonstrate a dissociation in which the reverse form of content specificity could have 
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been demonstrated. For example showing a pattern of content-specific (i.e. paranoid) 
interpretation bias in clinical psychosis, which was simultaneously absent in another 
psychological disorder, such as clinical depression, would have made our results even 
more compelling. Secondly, we did not assess other cognitive mechanisms, such as 
attentional biases, only interpretation. It is possible that similar content-specific effects 
could operate during selective attentional processes and might make additional important 
contributions to the maintenance of symptoms involving paranoid beliefs. Future work 
should investigate this. Finally, materials used for the jumping to conclusions task were 
not emotional and therefore could not capture differences in pathology-congruent biases. 
Future work could include materials that use social/emotional stimuli (e.g. Lincoln et al., 
2011; Menon et al., 2008).  
There are some clinical implications of our study. Our data do not demonstrate 
causality, but it may be possible in future work to manipulate the biases that we have 
measured here in an initial proof of principle. If so, it would then be possible to go on to 
assess whether clinical benefits might follow from manipulations specifically designed to 
reduce negative biases related to paranoid thoughts and beliefs. Cognitive Bias 
Modification (CBM) is a relatively new theory-driven treatment approach that uses a 
computerised task to manipulate pathological biases toward more adaptive information 
processing. CBM has been applied with varying levels of efficacy across a range of 
disorders (Cristea et al., 2015). The data presented here suggest that the version of CBM 
designed to manipulate interpretation (e.g. Lee et al., 2015) might be suitable for 
adaptation and testing as a possible technique to modify interpretation biases associated 
with paranoia. Subject to proof of principle of this sort, further development could lead to 
                                                                                     Interpretation biases in paranoia    
   
 
30 
interventions designed to specifically target unhelpful paranoid beliefs. Such work could 
complement and enhance other training packages, such as Metacognitive training of 
cognitive biases (Mortiz & Woodward, 2010), Social Cognition and Interaction Training 
(SCIT; Penn, Roberts, Combs, & Sterne, 2007) and reasoning training in delusions (Ross, 
Freeman, Dunn, & Garety, 2011).  
In summary, this study extends previous work in subclinical paranoia and 
provides evidence of interpretation biases directly related to core content of symptomatic 
paranoid beliefs in psychosis patients. Two convergent measures of interpretation bias 
used carefully controlled and matched stimuli to experimentally measure both valenced 
and paranoia-specific biases in interpretation of emotional ambiguity. Negative biases 
were observed in both patient groups compared to healthy controls and paranoid patients 
showed stronger biases on material permitting specifically paranoid interpretations, than 
on other types of ambiguous material, although evidence was mixed concerning whether 
this content specific effect applied uniquely to the paranoid patient group. Biased 
interpretation is already established as an underlying cognitive mechanism with 
etiological importance in a range of other disorders (Yiend, 2010) and this study is an 
important preliminary step toward advancing our understanding of similar mechanisms in 
psychosis. We conclude that biased interpretation specifically related to paranoia 
deserves further detailed empirical investigation as a putative causal and maintaining 
mechanism in psychosis and may be a suitable target for developing new interventions 
such as bias modification. 
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Notes: WTAR: Welscher Test of Adult Reading; PANSS: Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, GPTS: Green Paranoid Thoughts 





n = 32 
Non-paranoid 
patients 
n = 29 
Healthy 
controls  




Age 42.75 (7.72) 39.59 (8.80) 37.41 (15.51) F(2,87) = 1.79, .17 
Gender (% male) 59.38 65.51 44.82 X2 = 2.68, .26 
WTAR  40.40 (10.16) 40.93 (8.95) 42.79 (6.16) F(2,85) = .63, .54 
PANSS     
P6 Persecution/Suspiciousness  3.45 (0.88) 1.55 (0.63)  t(58) = 9.49, < .001 
Positive Symptoms  15.90 (4.05) 11.90 (4.69)  t(58) = 3.55, .001 
Negative Symptoms  15.19 (6.32) 12.59 (4.10)  t(58) = 1.88, .065  
General Symptoms  30.45 (7.37) 25.62 (6.49)  t(58) = 2.69, .009 
Total Symptoms 61.55 (15.18) 50.10 (12.15)  t(58) = 3.21, .002 
Green Paranoid Thoughts  90.03 (40.00) 58.41 (24.52) 38.90 (7.33) F(2,87) = 26.14, < .001 
Paranoia Scale 52.41 (20.36) 42.03 (17.13) 27.45 (7.21)  F(2,87) = 18.39, < .001 
PDI-21total 109.53 (61.84) 64.18 (64.41) 21.38 (23.56) F(2,80) = 21.41, < .001 
HADS total 18.27 (9.54) 13.04 (7.30) 5.07 (3.67) F(2,76) = 23.89, p < .001 
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Table 2. (a) Correlations between bias measures for each task (SRT: Similarity Ratings task, SST: Scrambled Sentences task, JTC: 
Jumping to Conclusions tasks) across all participants and (b) correlations between bias measures for each task and the Paranoia Scale, 
Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale and Peter’s Delusion Inventory across patients.  
 
Notes: Values are Pearson’s r, p value 
 
 
(a) n = 90 SRT Negative Index SST Paranoid % SST Negative % JTC Beads  
SRT Paranoid Index .36, .001* .58, < .001* .42, < .001* -.07, .56  
SRT Negative Index  .23, .046* .13, .26 -1.76, .12  
SST Paranoid %   .70, < .001* -.10, .35  
SST Negative %    .02, .89  
      
(b) n = 61 Paranoia Scale Green Paranoid 
Thoughts 
PDI-21   
SRT Paranoid Index .39, < .001* .34, .002* .38, .001*   
SRT Negative Index .30, .006* .22, .046* .27, .02*   
SST Paranoid % .55, < .001* .59, < .001* .74, < .001*   
SST Negative % .55, < .001* .61, < .001 .60, < .001*   
JTC Beads -.17, .11 -.15, .16 -.22, .046*   
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Table 3. Mean similarity ratings for each sentence type on the Similarity Ratings task and percentage of unscrambled sentences for 
each sentence type on the Scrambled Sentences task 
 
  Paranoid Content  Valenced Content 

























































































































Figure 1. Patterns of interpretation bias on the Similarity Ratings task across groups 
a) Pattern of results for material relevant to paranoid concerns only. Values are mean ratings of similarity between disambiguating 
target sentences (reflecting one or other possible interpretation) and the original ambiguous passage and reflect the significant 
Stimulus Direction x Group interaction reported in the text. Higher ratings reflect more paranoid/non-paranoid interpretations. * 
denotes significant difference at p<.05 





b) Pattern of results across both types of material (paranoia relevant and general negative/positive valence) for target items only. 
Values are ‘interpretation bias scores’ which, unlike raw similarity rating scores, reflect the overall degree of bias by taking into 
account both directions of endorsement (paranoid or negative and non-paranoid or positive). Index score = magnitude of (mean 
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Figure 2 Patterns of interpretation bias on the Scrambled Sentences task across groups. Values are percentages of sentences 
unscrambled as paranoid/negative. Paranoid patients made significantly more paranoid interpretations than negative interpretations, 
reflecting content specificity for paranoia relevant information; Neither the non-paranoid patients, nor control groups, differed in the 
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